Iniuria
138. The delict of Iniuria differs from the others mentioned in the Institutes in a noticeable way. It is defined not in terms of the harm done, as they are, but of the motive with which it is done. It is anything unlawful done with the object of insulting. This kind of wrong is clearly the creation of a fiurly developed civilisation. Though iniuria is mentioned in the Xn Tables, it does not there mean insult, but violence to person or property. The malum carmen of the XII Tables is not libel or slander, but magic incantations which are likely to injure crops or cause other harm. Considerably later, remedies are given by the praetor for defamatory words, and about the end of the Republic an actio iniuriarum appears which aims at repressing insults. Gradually under juristic influence it is
extended in its scope, since there are many ways of insulting a man beside calling him names, until in the late classical law any wanton interference with right is regarded as an iniuria, if, on the evidence, it appears to have been done with intent to
annoy or insult, or to lessen the esteem in which the injured person is held.
Iniuria differs also from the other delicts in the mode of estimation of damages, which were obviously difficult to fix in the case of insult. They vary in each case depending on the grossness of the insult, but also according to the position of the person insulted. The fact that an iniuria is atrox, either because of the nature of the wrong itself, or of the publicity of it, or of the statm of the person insulted, led to certain well-known diflferences in treatment, not such as to call for discussion. It may however be worth while to say that the texts do not really justify the view that the distinction was a clearly defined one: it was for the praetor to decide whether the iniuria was atrox or not, and to issue the formula according to his conclusion: the facts just mentioned are only such indications as would guide him.
The manner in which the whole proceeding is stated in the sources shews that it was essentially intended as a solatium for the wounded amour propre of the insulted man. Hence it was that unless he had shewed, at the time, that he was stung, the action did not lie, that he must bring the action within one year, and that though he died within the year his heir could not bring the action or continue it unless it had reached litis contestatio.
The fact that if insult were intended to a man the action lay, even though the wrongful act or speech had no direct reference to him, led to the possibility that several persons might have an action for the same insult. Thus, for an insult to a filiu^familias, his paterfamilias, besides the action which he might bring on behalf of his son, might have one on his own account, and they were quite independents For an insult to a woman, she, her husband and her father, might all have actions. For an insult to a slave any person interested in him might conceivably have an action if intent to insult him was proved. Where a common slave was insulted each of his masters might have the action, and we are told that the damages would not necessarily be proportionate to the shares in the man, but would be affected by the position of the plaintiff. It must be admitted however that the texts are in apparent conflict on
this point ^.
fragment from W. W. BUCKLAND, M.A., "Elementary Principles of the Roman Law". Cambridge University Press. UK
